

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
STAFF MESSAGE BRANCH  
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN : 32386 (9 Oct 63) H/ptl

ACTION : NIN-9.

INFO : XPD-3, XOP-1, XOPX-4, JCS-25, ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-8, DIA-25,  
DIA/CIIC-2, CIA-11, NSA-7, SMB-1 (101)

SMB E 322

PP RUEAHQ

DE RUHLKM 1910A 09/0753Z

BT

S E C R E T ZUI RUEAHQ 49S 09/0356Z H/W ZDK RUHLKM 1016 H 08/0053Z

P 072240Z SECT ONE OF TWO

PP RUCDAA RUCOSW RUEAHQ RUWGALE

DE RUHLKM 1016H 1016H 03/0053Z

P 372240Z

OFM PACAF

TO RUMRDA/3AIRDIV ANDERSEN AFB GUAM

RUAUAR/DET 1 3AIRDIV YOKOTA AB JAPAN

RUAUAZ/PAC COMM ELINT CEN FUCHU AS JAPAN

RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN

RUAOKA/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKI

RUAOKM/18TACFTRWG KADENA AB OKI

RUAUAR/3BOMBWG YOKOTA AB JAPAN

RUAUAS/6100SPTWG TACHIKAWA AB JAPAN

RUAUAR/67TECH REC SQ YOKOTA AB JAPAN

RUAROP/314AIRDIV OSAN AB KOREA

RUMALC/13AF CLARK AB PHIL

RUAKBD/ATF 13 P TAIPEI AS TAIWAN

RUAUAU/6499SPTGP JOHNSON AS JAPAN

RUAUAF/39AIRDIV MISAWA AB JAPAN

RUAUAR/41AIRDIV YOKOTA AB JAPAN

RUAUAG/3TACFTRWG ITAZUKE AB JAPAN

RUAUAZ/1 WEAWG FUCHU AS JAPAN

RUCDAA/AWS SCOTT AFB ILL

RUEAHQ/CSAF

RUCOSW/AU

RUMAGL/SECOND AIRDIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM

RUAOKH/51FTRINTCPWG NAHA AB OKI

RUMBC/CHJUSMAG THAILAND

RUMBD/6010TACGP DON MUANG APRT THAILAND

RUAKBD/DET 3 6499SPTGP TAIPEI AS TAIWAN

RUWGALE/DC

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USAF review(s) completed.

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ONE  
2-ORF

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CI

3-SOI

2-DODS  
SPOG

OGC  
BR

OCF/R/E  
OCF/R/A

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AT 11:19 (19 Oct 63)

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RUMPB/CINCPACFLT

RUMGZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

SECRET PFIWA 7659 CSAF CY FOR SECTION 1 OF 2

AFNIN, AFOOP, AND AFYPD. AU CY FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

COURSE, AC&amp;SC. THAILAND CY FOR AC/S INTELLIGENCE.

AC/S INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NR 118-63. THIS MESSAGE IN FIVE PARTS.

PART I. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

CONTINUING INTERNAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT DIEM WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY TWO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE FIRST WAS THE SIXTH SELF-IMMOLATION SUICIDE PROTEST BY BUDDHISTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT SINCE MAY WHILE THE SECOND INVOLVED THE DEFECTION OF A VNAF FIGHTER PILOT TO CAMBODIA WITH AN A-1H AIRCRAFT. ALSO, IN CONNECTION WITH THE BUDDHIST MONK'S SUICIDE, THREE US CORRESPONDENTS WERE SET UPON AND MAULED BY POLICE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT PHOTOGRAPHING OF THE BONZE. THE US HAS LODGED AN OFFICIAL PROTEST OVER THE INCIDENT WHICH WILL FURTHER ESTRANGE ALREADY STRAINED WESTERN PRESS RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.

CONCERNING THE SELF-DESTRUCTION BY THE BUDDHIST MONK, AMBASSADOR LODGE REPORTS THAT A LEADING BUDDHIST SPOKESMAN IN SAIGON HAS INDICATED THERE ARE AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED BUDDHIST (BONZES AND LAYMEN) WILLING TO KILL THEMSELVES IF

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GIVEN PERMISSION BY SECT LEADERS. ALSO, THAT PROTEST GESTURES, PERHAPS INCLUDING FURTHER SUICIDES, MIGHT BE ORGANIZED FOR THE US CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION IN THE RVN.

THE DEFECTION INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING A ROUTINE FERRY FLIGHT FROM BIEN HOA TO DA NANG WHEN THE FLIGHT LEADER, AFTER TAKEOFF, PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TOWARD PHNOM PENH. HIS WINGMAN BROKE OFF AT THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AND RETURNED TO BASE. COL HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, STATED THE DEFECTION MAY BE THE RESULT OF PERSONAL FRICTION WITH THE SQUADRON COMMANDER BUT MOST LIKELY WAS DUE TO POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION. THE VNAF CAPTAIN HAS ASKED FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN CAMBODIA, CLAIMING HE NO LONGER WANTS TO SERVE A GOVERNMENT HOSTILE TO THE BUDDHISTS.

MEANWHILE, VIET CONG ACTIVITY DURING THE WEEK OF 26 SEPTEMBER -22 OCTOBER CONTINUED AT A HIGH LEVEL BUT DID NOT REACH THE RECORD PEAK OF TWO WEEKS AGO. THERE WERE MORE ATTACKS THAN THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND ONE COMPANY-SIZE ATTACK WAS REPORTED FROM THE II CORPS AREA WHICH NETTED THE VIET CONG MANY WEAPONS. THE I AND III CORPS REPORTED A LIGHT DECLINE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY THIS WEEK, BUT THE III CORPS RECORDED A SIZEABLE INCREASE OF ENEMY ACTIONS FOR THE SECOND

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CONSECUTIVE WEEK. THE IV CORPS ALSO REPORTED INCREASED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY, ONE-THIRD OVER THAT OF LAST WEEK. ARMED ATTACKS CONTINUED HIGH AGAINST STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

VIET CONG ACTIVITY UP TO MID-AUGUST WAS CHARACTERIZED BY ONE TO TWO WEEKS OF INTENSIFIED ACTIVITY FOLLOWED BY A DECLINE OF FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS. THE VIET CONG HAVE NOW MAINTAINED A HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY FOR THE LAST FIVE WEEKS INDICATING AN ABILITY TO SUSTAIN MILITARY AND OTHER ACTIVITIES LONGER THAN TWO CONSECUTIVE WEEKS. (S)

CONCERNING CASUALTIES, RVN PERSONNEL LOSSES DROPPED FROM THE HIGH OF LAST WEEK, 827 TO 400, INCLUDING 128 KILLED. VIET CONG LOSSES DROPPED AS SHARPLY AS THOSE OF THE RVN, FROM 847 TO 442, OF WHICH 355 WERE KILLED. RVN TO VIET CONG TOTAL PERSONNEL LOSSES FOR THE PERIOD APPEAR ABOUT EQUAL, HOWEVER, THE RVN RETAINED A FAVORABLE KILL RATIO OF 2.8 TO 1.

IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, ON 2 OCTOBER 1963, J-2 MACV RECEIVED ITS FIRST TANGIBLE ALTHOUGH UNCONFIRMED EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE INFILTRATION OF A MILITARY UNIT INTO THE RVN IN 1963, WHEN A PRISONER-OF-WAR REPORT DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1963 WAS FORWARDED FROM ARVN I CORPS. ACCORDING TO THE PW, HIS UNIT WAS FORMED AT THE END OF 1962 AND RECEIVED INFILTRATION TRAINING AT VINH, NORTH VIETNAM. IN JANUARY 1963, THE UNIT, CONSISTING

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OF 5 OFFICERS AND 102 MEN, COMMENCED ITS TRIP BY TRUCK AND FOOT ALONG THE LAOS/RVN BORDER TO QUANG TIN PROVINCE IN THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS. IN MID-APRIL 1963, THE GROUP REACHED THE SITE OF HEADQUARTERS, 1ST VIET CONG REGIMENT, LOCATED IN WAR ZONE "X", AND WAS FORMED INTO THREE PLATOONS.

ANOTHER REPORT OF INFILTRATION WAS RECEIVED WHEN A VIET CONG PRIVATE CAPTURED INAN GIANG PROVINCE (DELTA AREA) ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1963, INDICATED HIS UNIT HAD RECENTLY ENTERED THE RVN FROM PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA. HE FURTHER STATED HIS COMPANY OF 100 MEN ENTERED THE RVN ALONG INFILTRATION ROUTES UTILIZING A SERIES OF BOATS AND SMALL BOATS. AMMUNITION FOR THIS UNIT IS OBTAINED FROM PHNOM PENH AND SMALL BOATS. MACV'S OVER-ALL CONCLUSION FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD REVEALS NO CHANGE IN VET CONG CAPABILITIES. (S) PARTIAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA CONTINUES WITH MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER RAHMAN APPARENTLY UPping THE STAKES SLIGHTLY BY NOW DEMANDING, AS A PRECONDITION TO ANY SUMMIT MEETING, THAT SUKARNO OPENLY DISCREDIT THE COMMUNISTS IN ADDITION TO ABIDING BY THE MANILA AGREEMENTS. THIS ACTION IS IN CONTRAST WITH PHILIPPINE FOREIGN SECRETARY LOPEZ'S REPORT THAT SUKARNO HAD INFORMED THE PHILIPPINES ON 6 OCTOBER HE WAS PREPARED TO ATTEND A SUMMIT MEETING

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"WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS WHATSOEVER".

IT APPEARS RAHMAN FEELS MALAYSIA IS IN A FAVORABLE POSITION INTERNATIONALLY WHILE INDONESIA ENJOYS LITTLE SUPPORT AND IS ECONOMICALLY CONCERNED, THEREFORE HIS BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO SIT TIGHT AND SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

BT

NOTE: Sec II 1s AFIN 30215 (8 Oct 63).

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